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RISE OF INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF ITS MERGER WITH NYSE EURONEXT 
Latoya C. Brown∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some of the world’s largest, successful exchanges are dinosaurs. From 
one angle, they are dinosaurs because of their age.1 For example, the 
London Stock Exchange and the Amsterdam Exchange’s timelines began in 
the 17th Century.2 The New York Stock Exchange traces its beginnings to 
1792.3 NASDAQ began trading over-the-counter securities in 1971.4 The 
Deutsche Borse traces its roots to 1585.5 From another angle, some are 
dinosaurs because of their clinging to outdated systems, or their failure to 
quickly adapt to significant changes with regards to how trading is done.6 
                                                                                                                           
 
∗ Ms. Brown is a practicing attorney in Florida and a former intern at the U.S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims 
responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed 
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the 
author’s colleagues upon the staff of the Commission. This article reflects the information available on 
this topic as of August 28, 2013. 
1 How NYSE fits among world stock exchanges, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 2012, http://www 
.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2012/12/20/world-stock-exchanges/1782267/ (“Large nations have 
had their own stock exchanges for decades, sometimes centuries.”). 
2 London: The LIFFE, NYSE, http://www.nyx.com/who-we-are/history/london; Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange, NYSE, http://www.nyx.com/who-we-are/history/amsterdam (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
3 New York Stock Exchange, NYSE EURONEXT, http://www.nyx.com/who-we-are/history/new-
york (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
4 How NYSE fits among world stock exchanges, supra note 1. 
5 Id. 
6 See infra Part III. See also generally Nathaniel Popper, Buying the NYSE, in One Shot, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/business/jeffrey-sprechers-improbable-path-
to-buying-the-nyse.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (speaking of the NYSE: “At the exchange itself last 
Wednesday, the 900-some men and women who work on the Big Board’s floor filed through the doors 
at 11 Wall Street in trading jackets of blue, red and green. Over the years, their number has dwindled 
steadily as computerized trading put many out of work.”). 
110 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 32:109 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.60 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
For example, the International Petroleum Exchange and the New York 
Board of Trade continued much of their trading with the dated open outcry 
approach.7 What results? Both these exchanges were acquired by a 
company that did not even exist thirteen years ago, and upon acquisition, 
trading floors gave way to the new age of technology.8 
This new kid on the block, making such bold acquisitions, is the 
IntercontinentalExchange (“ICE”): ICE was founded in 2000.9 In only a 
little over a decade, ICE is already being recognized as a market leader and 
a prominent market player.10 Part II of this paper looks at ICE’s beginnings 
and its impressive growth. Part III evaluates the impending merger between 
ICE and the New York Stock Exchange Euronext (“NYX”). And in Part IV 
this paper will discuss the implications of the merger by examining how 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 Popper, supra note 6. 
8 See id. 
9 IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2013) [hereinafter 2012 Annual 
Report (Form 10-K)] (“We were formed in May 2000 as an OTC energy marketplace. Since that time, 
we have expanded our business into commodity futures markets and clearing houses through 
acquisitions and internal development.”); Christopher C. Faille, Zero-Sum Game: The Rise of the 
World’s Largest Derivatives Exchanges by Erika S. Olson, 58 FED. LAW. 58, 59 (June 2011) (book 
review); Global Markets in Clear View: IntercontinentalExchange, ICE, 2 (2013) 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ICE/0x0x654206/F9D195E8-84BA-448A-ACCC-
C32CCCB82857/ICE_at_a_glance.pdf [hereinafter Global Markets in Clear View] 
(“IntercontinentalExchange is formed to develop a transparent marketplace for managing risk in the 
OTC energy markets.”). 
10 Annual Volume Survey, FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N, 4 (Mar. 2011), http://www.futuresindustry 
.org/downloads/Volume-Mar_FI(R).pdf (ranking ICE as #14 of Top Derivatives Exchanges Worldwide, 
based on number of futures and options traded and/or cleared in 2010); Karen T.Y. Shaw, A 
Comparative Analysis of the Regulation of Derivatives Under the Dodd-Frank Act and the Québec 
Derivatives Act, 26 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 491, 507 (2011) (“Market players such as the CME Group 
and IntercontinentalExchange (also known as ICE) are just two prominent clearing houses already 
established in the market and these organizations have a more advantageous position in gathering a 
dominant market share over any new entrant.”); Houman B. Shadab, Counterparty Regulation and Its 
Limits: The Evolution of the Credit Default Swaps Market, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 689, 704 
(2009/2010) (“As of November 2009, clearinghouses operated by the IntercontinentalExchange in both 
the United States and Europe had established themselves as market leaders in clearing over $2 trillion in 
CDS indexes.”); Popper, supra note 6 (“In the United States, ICE is now the second-most-important 
futures trading company, after the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.”); Leslie Josephs & Jacob Bunge, ICE 
Thickened With Clever Moves: 12-Year-Old Company Dominates Commodity-Futures Trading, 
Aggressively Expanded Into Other Market Platforms, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2012, http://online 
.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324731304578191562650145522.html (explaining that ICE “has 
been quietly transforming the way energy and other commodities are traded for more than a decade.”). 
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issues of globalization, demutualization, fragmentation, regulation, and 
antitrust factor in.11 
This paper ultimately concludes that the ICE-NYX merger embodies 
the model exchanges should seek to emulate in order to remain competitive 
in the global financial services industry: that is, a mega-exchange with 
dominant electronic trading platforms. As humans are substantially being 
replaced by machines, and transactions are occurring at the speed at light, 
exchanges need to continuously reinvent themselves to keep up.12 
Furthermore, the ICE-NYX merger is a necessary move not only for the 
two companies involved but also for the American markets as a whole, in 
which exchanges are losing their dominance.13 
II. ICE’S DEVELOPMENT 
ICE is the brainchild of Jeffrey Sprecher and is backed by some of the 
largest investment bankers and energy traders.14 Hence, ICE’s impressive 
growth and success should probably not be that surprising. Sprecher 
purchased Continental Power Exchange (“CPE”), ICE’s predecessor, in 
1997.15 CPE, which provided an electronic trading platform, seemed poised 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 These concepts are very broad and an expansive look is beyond the scope of this article. Hence 
the discussion will be brief and to the extent needed to discuss the ICE-NYX merger. 
12 See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 681 (2013) (“Computer 
technology has made finance faster, larger, more global, and more interconnected in form and function. 
An industry once monopolized by humans has evolved into an industry in which machines play a larger 
and more influential role. Modern finance is a stage on which the main players are no longer entirely 
human. Instead, they are cyborgs: part machine, part human. Modern finance is transforming into what 
this Article calls “cyborg finance,” or “cy-fi.” This sea change is ongoing, incomplete, and without a 
final judgment on its normative impact and consequences.”). See also infra Part III. 
13 Chris Isidore, NYSE to be sold to IntercontinentalExchange, CNN (Dec. 20, 2012), http:// 
money.cnn.com/2012/12/20/investing/nyse-merger/index.html (“With the continued growth of 
electronic trading, New York City’s Wall Street continues to lose its dominance as the world’s financial 
capital.”). 
14 Addressing High Gas Prices, 154 CONG. REC. S.5565 (daily ed. June 12, 2008) (statement of 
Sen. Bernie. Sanders), 154 CONG. REC. S.5565, at *5572 (LEXIS) (“Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, 
BP and other major institutional investors even co-founded the IntercontinentalExchange that now 
trades West Texas Intermediate crude oil to U.S. investors free of U.S. regulatory oversight.”); Popper, 
supra note 6; A Plan for Online Trading of Metals and Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2000, http://www 
.nytimes.com/2000/03/22/business/a-plan-for-online-trading-of-metals-and-oil.html. See also Louise 
Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Trading in Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2010, http://www 
.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/business/12advantage.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
15 2012 Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 9, at 52. 
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for unlimited success until Enron developed its own platform and went on 
to dominate.16 Enron’s threat to CPE’s vitality was, however, Sprecher’s 
blessing in disguise. Enron was the buyer and seller for each transaction 
done on its electronic platform, and this model did not go over well with 
Wall Street banks, which were some of the biggest traders of energy 
products.17 
Hence, when Sprecher began seeking investors for CPE, banks like 
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs were happy to invest in Enron’s 
competitor.18 To facilitate the deal, Sprecher gave up a large percent of his 
ownership interest to the banks, which in turn gave their own stakes to 
several of the largest power companies.19 CPE was renamed 
IntercontinentalExchange, and headquartered in Atlanta.20 After Enron’s 
demise ICE became, and remains, one of the most prominent players in the 
marketplace.21 ICE became a publicly-traded company in 2005.22 
ICE’s unapologetic and reformatory business approach came to light 
way before its current efforts to merge with market giant, NYX. In 2001, 
ICE outbid Nymex to acquire the International Petroleum Exchange 
(“IPE”).23 In 2007, ICE completed acquisition of the then 127-year-old 
New York Board of Trade (“NYBOT”).24 In that same year, ICE purchased 
                                                                                                                           
 
16 Popper, supra note 6. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. (“In the negotiations that followed, Mr. Sprecher used what would become a trademark 
strategy: giving up part of the ownership of his company in exchange for a promise that the recipients 
would use his platform. In this case, he gave up 80 percent of the ownership to the two banks. The banks 
soon turned around and gave part of their own stakes to several of the largest power companies, 
including Shell, Total and British Petroleum, which committed to using what was soon rechristened as 
IntercontinentalExchange.”). 
20 Id. 
21 Honorable Walt Lukken, Keynote Address at American University Washington College of Law 
Administrative Law Review Symposium: Energy Law (Oct. 2, 2008) (“The most prominent ECM 
[exempt commercial market] is the IntercontinentalExchange in Atlanta (ICE)”), in 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 
653, 655 (Summer 2009); Popper, supra note 6; IntercontinentalExchange Now #284 Largest Company, 
Surpassing DTE Energy, FORBES, Mar. 6, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/dividendchannel/2013/ 
03/06/intercontinental-exchange-now-284-largest-company-surpassing-dte-energy/. 
22 IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 58 (2008). 
23 Global Markets in Clear View, supra note 9, at 2. 
24 Creating the Premier Global Market Operator IntercontinentalExchange Agreement to Acquire 
NYSE Euronext, ICE, 15 (Dec. 20, 2012), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ICE/ 
2435641743x0x622759/517e2eb3-f841-428f-98b4-bb89c1ef09ef/ICE%20NYSE%20Investor% 
20Presentation%2012-20-12%20Final.pdf [hereinafter ICE Agreement to Acquire NYX]. 
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the then 120-year-old Winnipeg Commodity Exchange.25 ICE continued its 
expansion in 2008 with the acquisition of Creditex, an entity which 
executed and processed credit default swaps, with operations in the United 
States, Europe, and Asia.26 And in 2010 ICE bought Climate Exchange, 
which operated carbon emissions exchanges.27 
In terms of its business, ICE operates five clearinghouses, two over-
the-counter (“OTC”) markets, three futures exchanges, and a market data 
business (including real-time trades, daily indices, forward curves, and 
market time validations).28 By 2013, ICE’s global product offering is 
broken down as: 62% energy, 11% agriculture, 14% financial, and 13% 
market data and miscellaneous.29 Of the 1.4 billion in revenue the company 
reported in 2012, 52% is accounted to the United States and 48% 
internationally. 
With its global operations and presence, ICE is subject to regulatory 
oversight by various agencies, including the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”), UK’s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), and Canada’s 
Manitoba Securities Commission (“MSC”).30 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 Roberta Rampton, Winnipeg grain traders unfazed by ICE takeover, REUTERS, Aug. 22, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/22/ice-winnipeg-takeover-idUSN2235341620070822. 
26 Press Release, IntercontinentalExchange, IntercontinentalExchange Announces Acquisition of 
Creditex Group Inc. (June 3, 2008), available at http://ir.theice.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID= 
313527. 
27 See Press Release, IntercontinentalExchange, IntercontinentalExchange Announces Acquisition 
of Climate Exchange (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://ir.theice.com/investors-and-media/press/press-
releases/press-release-details/2010/IntercontinentalExchange-Announces-Acquisition-of-Climate-
Exchange/default.aspx; ICE buys Climate Exchange, REUTERS, Apr. 30, 2010, http://www.reuters 
.com/article/2010/04/30/us-jlc-ice-climate-exchange-idUSTRE63T3FG20100430. There were a number 
of other acquisitions or expansions efforts between its inception in 2000 and 2012. For a concise 
overview, see ICE Agreement to Acquire NYX, supra note 24, at 15. 
28 See Global Markets in Clear View, supra note 9, at 1–2; ICE Commodity & Derivatives 
Markets, ICE, http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ICE/0x0x324982/157de031-b9a5-4718-95fd-
b1617d01886d/ICE_Org_Structure.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
29 Global Markets in Clear View, supra note 9, at 1–2. See also ICE Commodity & Derivatives 
Markets, supra note 28, at 1. 
30 2012 Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 9, at 97–98. 
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III. THE ICE-NYX MERGER AGREEMENT 
In order to expand its roots from commodities into new areas of 
financial services, ICE announced its acquisition of NYX—pending 
regulatory approval—in December 2012.31 The deal, as structured, is 
valued at $33.12 per NYSE share and gives NYX shareholders the right to 
choose cash, stock, or a combination of those two, subject to proration.32 
After the merger is completed, NYSE shareholders will own approximately 
36% of ICE shares.33 Though the transaction is currently valued at 8.6 
billion, “[t]he final purchase price will be based on the actual market price 
per share of ICE common stock on the closing date of the acquisition, 
which is anticipated in the second half of 2013, subject to regulatory 
approvals.”34 Sprecher will be Chairman and CEO of the combined 
company, and four persons from the NYX Board of Directors will become 
part of ICE’s fifteen member board of directors.35 
ICE has a track record of significantly changing or erasing business 
models of its acquired entities.36 In the case of its merger with NYX, ICE 
                                                                                                                           
 
31 Id. at 4; Isidore, supra note 13 (“NYSE Euronext, the operator of the venerable New York 
Stock Exchange, has agreed to be bought for $8.2 billion by an upstart that runs other international 
trading exchanges.”); Tom Groenfeldt, IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) Merger With NYSE Euronext 
Will Reshape Markets, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/2013/03/ 
22/intercontinentalexchange-ice-merger-with-nyse-euronext-will-reshape-markets/ [hereinafter (ICE) 
Merger With NYX]; Global Markets in Clear View, supra note 9, at 2. 
32 The detailed breakdown of the blended consideration is as follows: “NYSE Euronext 
shareholders will have the option to elect to receive consideration per NYSE Euronext share of (i) 
$33.12 in cash, (ii) 0.2581 IntercontinentalExchange common shares or (iii) a mix of $11.27 in cash plus 
0.1703 ICE common shares, subject to a maximum cash consideration of approximately $2.7 billion and 
a maximum aggregate number of ICE common shares of approximately 42.5 million.” Press Release, 
IntercontinentalExchange, IntercontinentalExchange to Acquire NYSE Euronext for $33.12 Per Share in 
Stock and Cash, Creating Premier Global Market Operator (Dec. 20, 2012), available at http://ir.theice 
.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=728039 [hereinafter Dec. 2012 Press Release]. In terms of financing, 
“The cash portion of the transaction will be funded by a combination of cash on hand and existing ICE 
credit facilities.” Id. 
33 ICE Agreement to Acquire NYX, supra note 24, at 6. 
34 2012 Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 9, at 4. 
35 ICE Agreement to Acquire NYX, supra note 24, at 6. 
36 See, e.g., Popper, supra note 6 (discussing ICE’s removal of historic trading floors of IPE and 
NYBOT); Josephs & Bunge, supra note 10 (“But ICE continues to move forward with its electronic-
trading platform. In October, the exchange shut down open-outcry trading for options on orange juice, 
arabica coffee, raw sugar, cocoa and cotton. Soft commodities became the last markets on ICE to switch 
to solely electronic trading.”). 
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has maintained, however, that it “is committed to preserving the NYSE 
Euronext brand . . . [and] will maintain dual headquarters in Atlanta and . . . 
in the Wall Street building, home to the iconic trading floor.”37 In addition, 
ICE plans to maintain NYSE Liffe in London, which is a market operator 
for derivatives products.38 
One of the prudent parts of the structuring of this deal is ICE’s 
formation of a new holding company, ICE Group Inc., under which NYX 
and ICE will operate as wholly-owned subsidiaries.39 This strategy, as Part 
V of this article will explain, may help avert regulatory quandaries because 
the companies’ products and status will, for the most, remain in 
recognizable form. Furthermore, the formation of ICE Group does not 
change the consideration NYSE shareholders are promised under the initial 
merger agreement, and “each share of ICE common stock will be converted 
into the right to receive one share of ICE Group common stock.”40 
Undoubtedly, the ICE-NYX merger is motivated by the prospects of 
increasing financial wealth and acquiring more prominence in global 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 Dec. 2012 Press Release, supra note 32. 
38 Id. 
39 IntercontinentalExchange Group, Inc., The Amended and Restated Merger Agreement, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 20, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1174746/000119312513115772/d506903d425.htm [hereinafter ICE’s Form 425] (“Pursuant to the 
Amended and Restated Merger Agreement, ICE and NYSE Euronext have agreed to revise the structure 
of their previously announced merger transaction to provide that ICE will acquire NYSE Euronext under 
a newly formed holding company, ICE Group, to facilitate the implementation of the governance 
provisions that will be required to be put into effect. Under the revised structure, following successive 
merger transactions, each of ICE and NYSE Euronext will become wholly-owned subsidiaries of ICE 
Group. The terms, economics and conditions of the Amended and Restated Merger Agreement 
otherwise are substantially the same as the terms of the Original Merger Agreement, including the 
merger consideration to be paid to NYSE Euronext stockholders. The Amended and Restated Merger 
Agreement provides that each share of ICE common stock will be converted into the right to receive one 
share of ICE Group common stock. Upon the completion of the mergers, ICE Group’s common stock is 
expected to be listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange under ICE’s current ticker symbol, 
‘ICE.’”); see also ZACKS.COM, ICE-NYSE Attempt to Ease Merger—Analyst Blog, NASDAQ (Mar. 20, 
2013), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/icenyse-attempt-to-ease-merger-analyst-blog-cm229168; Ruchika 
Tulshyan, ICE forms holding company for NYSE Euronext acquisition, ATLANTA BUS. CHRON., 
Mar. 21, 2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2013/03/21/ice-forms-holding-company-for-
nyse.html; Jacob Bunge, IntercontinentalExchange Chief’s Pay Down 15%, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323501004578390540829139244.html (stating that 
ICE and NYX “will be subsumed under a new entity called IntercontinentalExchange Group that retains 
the ICE ticker symbol”). 
40 ICE’s Form 425, supra note 39. 
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markets.41 And, even though the ICE Group will be a market leader, it will 
be playing catch up, at least in some areas, to market giants, such as the 
CME Group Inc.42 But ICE’s acquisition of NYX is more than simple 
economics: arguably, it is a necessary move for the companies to be able to 
maximize their growth potential in the evolving market landscape, remain 
competitive, and meet customers’ needs.43 
For example, by merging their multi-asset class companies, the ICE-
NYX merger promises not only for growth and competiveness in the 
marketplace internationally, but also for: capital efficiency, by cutting costs 
via the combination of trading platforms for example; maximization of 
revenues; diversification of revenue sources; and unlocking of value 
through merger related cost synergy.44 This is in no way saying that this 
mega-merger, or others of its kind, poses no potential detriment or systemic 
risks.45 But the existence of those risks does not change the fact that mega-
                                                                                                                           
 
41 Already, in their own respects, ICE and NYX are very successful entities. For example, “. . . 
ICE outearned other U.S.-listed exchange companies last year, including NYSE, [and] the Atlanta-based 
company’s [had a] 8% rise in net income to $552 million . . . ,” Bunge, supra note 39. The NYSE has 
been ranked number one based on the largest domestic equity market capitalizations at year-end 2012 
and 2011, according to data by the World Federation of Stock Exchanges (“WFE”). 2012 WFE Market 
Highlights, WORLD FED’N EXCHANGES, 6 (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.world-exchanges.org/files/ 
statistics/2012%20WFE%20Market%20Highlights.pdf. 
42 Jacob Bunge, NYSE takeover deal passes U.S. antitrust overseers, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 19, 
2013), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nyse-takeover-deal-passes-us-antitrust-overseers-2013-02-
19-124855035 (“While both exchange companies offer U.S. futures linked to stock indexes, their 
markets combined are far smaller in terms of trading activity than similar equity-focused markets run by 
competitor CME Group Inc. (CME).”). 
43 See (ICE) Merger With NYX, supra note 31 (Speaking at an event held by the Futures Industry 
Association, Sprecher is quoted as follows: “ICE has acquired asset classes in different jurisdictions, but 
not just for growth . . . . [A]part from regulation, the customs change in different locales, so it helps to 
have assets in Europe and U.S. Our customers are big and global and they are trying to figure out how to 
manage risk globally. We have had to move things around like chess pieces in order to keep up with 
clients’ needs. M&A isn’t so much trying to be big but to have enough pieces to solve customer 
problems.”); Dec. 2012 Press Release, supra note 32. 
See also 2012 Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 9 (statement of CEO, Sprecher: “believe 
that the combination of ICE with NYSE Euronext will result in an expanded portfolio of products and 
services available to our customers and provide new growth and diversification opportunities for 
investors.”). 
44 Dec. 2012 Press Release, supra note 32; ICE Agreement to Acquire NYX, supra note 24, at 4–
21. 
45 Commentators have acknowledged the potential risks concerns associated with exchange 
mergers. See, e.g., Christina D. Cress, Note & Comment, The Failed NYSE Euronext-Deutsche Borse 
Group Merger: Foreshadowing Future Consolidation of the Global Stock Exchange Market?, 16 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 375, 388–400 (2012) (discussing the risks in the context of the attempted and failed 
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mergers are strategic answers, from a business perspective, to the current 
financial landscape.46 
In fact, as depicted below, exchange merger and acquisition has been 
the increasing trend over the last decade.47 
Tabular Depiction of Exchange Merger/Consolidation Activity 
2000 Merger of Paris Bourse, the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange, and the Brussels Stock Exchange to 
form Euronext N.V. 
Successful 
2001 ICE acquires International Petroleum Exchange. Successful 
2002 Euronext purchases London International 
Financial Futures and Options (LIFFE). 
Successful 
2003 OM London Exchange and the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. 
Successful 
2004 Deutsche Börse makes offer for LSE. Failed 
2005 OMX merges with Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Successful 
                                                                                                                           
 
NYX-Deutsche Börse merger); Peter Kim, Note, Securities Exchange Merger Activity, 26 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 85, 86–98 (2007). See also supra Part III. 
46 See supra Part III. 
47 Table sources: London: The LIFFE, supra note 2; Nu Ri Jung, The Present and Future of the 
Financial Services Industry: Convergence, Consolidation, Conglomeration, and Collaboration, 29 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 729, 741–42 (2011); Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock 
Exchange: The Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355, 355 (2007); 
Ioannis Kokkoris & Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Some Issues on Cross-Border Stock Exchange Mergers, 
29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 455, 456 (2007); ICE Agreement to Acquire NYX, supra note 24, at 15; Brenda 
Goh, Factbox: A history of global exchange merger activity, REUTERS, May 16, 2011, http://www 
.reuters.com/article/2011/05/16/us-factbox-exchanges-idUSTRE74F4RJ20110516; CME and CBOT 
Complete Merger Creating the Leading Global Financial Exchange, CME GROUP INC. (July 12, 2007), 
http://investor.cmegroup.com/investor-relations/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=254207; Kim, supra note 
45, at 85–99; New York Stock Exchange, supra note 3. 
See also Cress, supra note 45, at 375–76 (“‘Megamergers,’ such as the proposed NYSE 
Euronext-Deutsche Börse Group (NYX-DB) merger, are not new phenomena. The trend towards 
globalization within the international stock exchange market began more than a decade ago.”); Kokkoris 
& Olivares-Caminal, supra note 47, at 459. 
In addition, “[c]ommodity exchanges began to negotiate cross-border linkages prior to such 
transactions between security exchanges,” with a few of these linkages occurring between 1984 and 
1998. Karmel, supra note 47, at 379. 
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2006 NYSE merges with Archipelago Holdings. Successful 
 OMX buys Iceland Stock Exchange in a deal 
valued at 250 million SEK. 
 
 Hostile takeover attempt of London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) by Nasdaq. 
Failed 
 Australia Stock Exchange and Sydney Futures 
Exchange. 
Successful 
 OMX AB consolidates and acquires Iceland Stock 
Exchange. 
Successful 
 Consolidated all of the companies from its 
Stockholm, Helsinki and Copenhagen exchanges 
and acquires Icelandic stock exchange. 
 
 Deutsche Börse’s offer for Euronext. Failed 
2007 Deutsche Börse and International Securities 
Exchange. 
Successful 
 NYSE merges with Euronext N.V. Successful 
 ICE acquires NYBOT. Successful 
 CME merges with CBOT. Successful 
 NASDAQ merges with OMX Nordic Exchanges. Successful 
 LSE purchases Borsa Italiana. Successful 
 ICE acquires Winnipeg Commodity Exchange. Successful 
 Toronto Stock Exchange merges with Montreal 
Stock Exchange. 
Successful 
2008 NYSE Euronext acquired the American Stock 
Exchange. 
Successful 
 Merger between Brazil’s BM&F SA (local 
commodities and futures exchange) and Bovespa 
Holding SA (managed the Brazilian Stock 
Exchange). 
Successful 
 CME acquired NYMEX. Successful 
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2010 ICE acquires Climate Exchange. Successful 
2011 Singapore Exchange bid for Australian Stock 
Exchange Ltd. 
Failed 
 Nasdaq and IntercontinentalExchange bid for 
NYSE Euronext. 
Failed 
Both ICE and the NYX have been on trend with regards to consolidations 
within the financial markets. Within its relatively short thirteen-year life 
span, ICE already has made at least ten acquisitions.48 Not to be outdone, 
NYSE merged with Euronext to become the “first trans-Atlantic linkup of 
stock and derivatives markets.”49 
The ICE-NYX merger, and exchange mergers in general, is necessary 
because of the current globalized and fragmented financial service 
industry.50 “‘Significant advances in information, transportation, and 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 See supra notes 23–27. In addition, ICE acquired YellowJacket in 2008, The Clearing 
Corporation in 2009, and Ballista in 2011. ICE Agreement to Acquire NYX, supra note 24, at 15. Of 
course, its merger with NYX is contingent on regulatory approval. 
49 Karmel, supra note 47, at 355. 
50 Jung, supra note 47, at 732. (2011) (“For example, ‘[g]lobally, foreign ownership of financial 
assets reached U.S. $67 trillion at the beginning of 2008, roughly one-third of total global financial 
assets, up from just U.S. $17 trillion, or one-fifth of global financial assets, a decade earlier.’”) (citing 
The Future of the Global Financial System, WORLD ECON. F., 14 (2009), http://www3.weforum.org/ 
docs/WEF_Scenario_FutureGlobalFinancialSystem_Report_2010.pdf). 
Concededly, consolidation may also be motivated by changes in the regulatory environment, 
which also sparks competitive pressures. See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MARKET 
STRUCTURE REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MARKET 
STRUCTURE GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP, 2 (last visited Nov. 18, 2013), 
www.sec.gov/rules/sro/ny9948/media/buck1.pdf [hereinafter SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MARKET 
STRUCTURE GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP] (“Globalization, technology (both at the point of order 
execution and order origination) and regulatory change have spurred new competition for the traditional 
securities markets, including the NYSE.”). 
See also Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3594 (proposed 
Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Concept Release on Equity Market Structure] (“Changes in market structure 
also reflect the markets’ response to regulatory actions such as Regulation NMS, adopted in 2005, the 
Order Handling Rules, adopted in 1996, as well as enforcement actions, such as those addressing anti-
competitive behavior by market makers in NASDAQ stocks.”); Lin, supra note 12, at 687–88 (“This 
transformation resulted from advances in technology and regulatory reforms over the last few decades. 
Beginning in the 1990s, advances in technology encouraged the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to introduce reforms like decimalization and Regulation Alternative Trading System (Reg ATS) 
to permit new trading systems and electronic communication networks for finance, which made today’s 
Wall Street possible. . . . By the mid-1990s, computers took over significant functions at major financial 
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telecommunication technologies have transformed global capital markets 
. . . . [I]ntensified competition, and triggered traditional market players to 
rethink their business strategies and rework their operations.’”51 Exchanges 
need fresh, new business models that allow them to keep apace and be 
competitive. One response by the exchanges, for example, has been to 
merge stock and derivative exchanges, as ICE-NYX is now doing.52 This 
kind of merger, especially, puts entities in a position to more completely 
meet customers’ needs via a broader range of asset classes.53 
As other industries, such as banking, become more centralized and 
cross-border, there is more pressure on exchanges to follow suit for cost 
effectiveness and efficiency.54 The benefit of merging two companies with 
extensive operations, such as ICE and NYX, is that operating costs will 
likely be significantly reduced.55 In the case of cross-border merger, for 
example, exchanges, by combining different geographic markets, can 
exploit economies of scale in trading.56 
                                                                                                                           
 
institutions. By then, computerized networks initiated and managed significant trading in many 
important financial markets such as stocks, bonds, currency, and commodities.”). 
51 Jung, supra note 47, at 729–30 (citing J. WILLIAMS HICK, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF 
U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 1:11 (Dec. 2012) (citing Margaret Chew, Reform of Financial Services: The 
Effect on the Regulator, 5 SINGAPORE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 569, 569 (2001))). 
52 See, e.g., Kokkoris & Olivares-Caminal, supra note 47, at 459 (“Stock exchanges have merged 
with derivative exchanges (for example, Euronext and LIFFE) and with settlement operators (for 
example, Deutsche Börse and Clearstream.”)). 
53 One of the stated objectives of the ICE-NYX merger is exactly this—to provide customers with 
a more extensive financial service. See Dec. 2012 Press Release, supra note 32 (“‘Our transaction is 
responsive to the evolution of market infrastructure today and offers a range of growth opportunities, 
while enhancing competition in U.S. and European markets and broadening our ability to address new 
markets and offer innovative products and services on a global platform,’ said ICE Chairman and CEO 
Jeffrey C. Sprecher. ‘We believe the combined company will be better positioned to compete and serve 
customers across a broad range of asset classes by uniting our global brands, expertise and 
infrastructure. With a track record of growth and returns, clearing and M&A integration, we are well 
positioned to transform our combined companies into a premier global exchange operator that remains a 
leader in market evolution.’”); Kokkoris & Olivares-Caminal, supra note 47, at 459. 
54 Kokkoris & Olivares-Caminal, supra note 47, at 456. 
55 See, e.g., Dec. 2012 Press Release, supra note 32; Kokkoris & Olivares-Caminal, supra note 
47, at 474 (“. . . the integration of the French, Belgian, Dutch, and Portuguese stock exchanges ‘allowed 
Euronext to rationalize its operations and significantly reduce its operating costs.’”) (citing Marco 
Pagano & A. Jorge Padilla, Efficiency gains from the integration of exchanges: lessons from the 
Euronext “natural experiment,” COMPETITION COMMISSION, 4 (May 4, 2005), http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/pdf/inquiry/ref2005/lse/main_submission_recei
ved_euronext_nv_lecg_2). 
56 Kokkoris & Olivares-Caminal, supra note 47, at 459. 
2013] RISE OF INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE 121 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.60 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Demutualization can be perceived both as a response to the global 
economy and fragmentation, as well as a facilitator of globalized financial 
markets.57 Simply defined, demutualization refers to the restructuring of 
exchanges from “non-profit, member-owned organizations to for-profit, 
investor-owned stock corporations with a further step of becoming publicly 
traded companies.”58 As a facilitator, demutualization allows for the once 
closed-off, members-only exchanges to open up not only to new 
possibilities of capital formation (from shareholders), but also to the 
possibility of consolidating with exchanges across different geographies. 
Hence, “demutualization features the convergence, consolidation, and 
conglomeration of the financial services industry in the interface context.”59 
As a response mechanism, demutualization is a way for exchanges to 
compete in an increasingly competitive, technological, concentrated global 
environment.60 By demutualizing and turning into publicly-listed 
companies, exchanges can maximize profits for their shareholders and raise 
                                                                                                                           
 
57 Demutualization in the U.S. began relatively late. The first exchange demutualization in the 
U.S. occurred well over a decade after the first demutualization—that of the Stockholm Exchange in 
1993. Roberta S. Karmel, IOSCO’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 J. CORP. L. 849, 892 (2012); 
Jung, supra note 47, at 740–41. In 2001, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”) became the first 
U.S. exchange to demutualize. Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications 
of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 368 (2002). 
CME’s demutualization—and demutualization of other U.S. exchanges—followed in close 
proximity to the SEC’s 1998 release which stated that: 
In this release, the Commission also expresses its view that registered exchanges 
may structure themselves as for-profit organizations. This will allow alternative trading 
systems, which are typically proprietary, to choose to register as exchanges without 
changing their organizational structure. In addition, currently registered exchanges—which 
are all membership organizations—could choose to demutualize. 
Regulation of Exchanges and Alternate Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 70844, 70848 (Dec. 22, 1998). 
In general, by 2005, 60% of the members of the World Federation of Exchanges had 
demutualized, and “[i]n 2007, seventy-six percent of the then fifty-three member exchanges of the 
World Federation of Exchanges were for-profit, and forty-one percent were publicly traded.” Jung, 
supra note 47, at 740. 
58 Jung, supra note 47, at 739. ICE went public in 2005, while NYX began trading publicly in 
March 2006. Global Markets in Clear View, supra note 9, at 1; Company Overview: NYSE Euronext—
Unlocking the World’s Potential, NYSE EURONEXT, http://www.nyx.com/who-we-are/company-
overview (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
59 Jung, supra note 47, at 742. 
60 See Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 
2542 (2006) (“Today, domestic and international competition increasingly compels stock exchanges to 
give up their exclusivity, undergo restructuring, and become publicly traded, for-profit companies, a 
process referred to as demutualization.”). 
122 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 32:109 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.60 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
additional capital.61 Another take on demutualization as a response 
mechanism, is that it is a solution for the exchanges to regain or maintain 
their competitive edge in an increasingly fragmented financial world.62 The 
concept of fragmentation will be explored in subpart B, below. 
Outside of being a facilitator or response mechanism, demutualization 
has been criticized for being problematic: particularly to the extent that it 
raises conflict of interest issues.63 Conflict arises because a demutualized 
exchange has to balance its role as a self-regulatory organization (SRO) and 
the need to maximize profits for its shareholders.64 ICE Futures Canada, for 
example, is “a commodity futures exchange and a self-regulatory 
organization under the Commodities Futures Act, 1996.”65 The concern has 
been that the overarching profit motive of demutualized, public exchanges 
may inhibit exchanges from developing and maintaining high listing 
standards, especially where these standards are unpopular with 
shareholders.66 One response to this concern has often been that “SROs 
have strong incentives to preserve their reputations as fair and prestigious 
                                                                                                                           
 
61 See Kokkoris & Olivares-Caminal, supra note 47, at 459; Kim, supra note 45, at 85 (stating 
that one day after the merger between the NYSE and Archipelago Holdings was completed, “the newly 
formed NYSE Group began to trade on the NYSE, completing the demutualization of the exchange and 
the beginning of its life as a public company. One of the evident reasons for the IPO was to use high-
priced shares to make acquisitions.”). 
62 Special Study Group of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, American Bar 
Association, Section of Business Law, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and 
Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1492 (2002) [hereinafter Special Study on Market 
Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance] (“One response to the competitive pressures 
caused by increasing fragmentation has been the decision by Nasdaq to demutualize.”). 
63 See, e.g., Jung, supra note 47, at 739–40 (“Demutualization changes the regulatory framework 
of stock exchanges ‘to emphasize shareholder value and customer focus,’ and incurs the tension 
between an exchange’s role as a self-regulatory organization (SRO) and, at the same time, being a for-
profit entity.”); Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, supra 
note 62, at 1492 (“Yet, demutualization raises potential conflicts of interest between profit-seeking and 
regulatory interests.”). 
64 See Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, supra 
note 62, at 1540. 
65 Regulation: Regulated Markets Across Borders, INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, https://www 
.theice.com/regulation.jhtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). It is primarily regulated by the Manitoba 
Securities Commission. Id. 
66 Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, supra note 
62, at 1540. 
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markets through requirements such as corporate governance listing 
standards.”67 
Acknowledging this concern, the challenge is going to be for 
regulators to be vigilant in their oversight because demutualization is here 
to stay. It is an important aspect of exchanges’ strategy to remain 
competitive in the marketplace. It is a necessary response to the effect of 
globalization and technology on the financial services industry. 
A. Implications of the Merger in a Fragmented Market 
There is not only a correlation between globalization and 
demutualization, but also one with fragmentation. Fragmentation is “when 
investor order flow is directed to different markets that are not connected or 
are ineffectively connected.”68 A primary impetus behind fragmentation is 
the technological innovations that have come to dominate trading and 
markets in general.69 Globally, there has been a dramatic change in 
secondary market structure from “primarily manual trading to a market 
structure with primarily automated trading.”70 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 Id. 
68 Maureen O’Hara & Mao Ye, Is Market Fragmentation Harming Market Quality?, 4 (Mar. 10, 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1356839. See also Concept 
Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 50, at 3594 (“Trading equities today is no longer as 
straightforward as sending an order to the floor of a single exchange on which a stock is listed. As 
discussed in section III below, the current market structure can be described as dispersed and complex: 
(1) Trading volume is dispersed among many highly automated trading centers that compete for order 
flow in the same stocks; and (2) trading centers offer a wide range of services that are designed to attract 
different types of market participants with varying trading needs.”); SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MARKET 
STRUCTURE GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP, supra note 50, at 3 (stating that fragmentation refers to 
“the trading of orders in several locations without interaction among the orders. . . .”). 
69 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 50, at 3594 (“A primary driver and 
enabler of this transformation of equity trading has been the continual evolution of technologies for 
generating, routing, and executing orders.”). 
70 Id. See also O’Hara & Ye, supra note 68, at 1 (“While the traditional exchanges continue to 
execute orders, they now face a host of competitors ranging from electronic platforms such as ECNS 
(electronic communication networks) and ATS (alternative trading systems), to the trading desks of 
broker/dealer firms, and even to a variety of new entrants such as futures and options markets. . . . And 
these changes are not just confined to the U.S. markets. European equity trading has seen dramatic 
growth of electronic platforms such as Chi-X and BATS, and even Canada, where the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (now known as the TMX group) enjoyed a virtual monopoly on trading, faces the prospect of 
a fragmented market with the addition of electronic venues such as Alpha, Pure and MATCH Now.”). 
See also Lin, supra note 12, at 690–91 (“While significant volumes of algorithmic trading still occur on 
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Electronic communication networks (“ECNs”) and alternative trading 
systems (“ATS”), for example, have been significant competitors to the 
traditional exchanges.71 And these have forced many exchanges to move a 
lot of their operation on screen to compete—customers may even have 
come to expect this.72 For example, after the acquisition of NYBOT was 
complete, ICE gave customers the choice of traditional trading floors or 
electronic trading.73 Most customers soon chose electronic trading.74 And 
soon NYBOT’s trading floors gave way to electronic trading.75 
It may be a hyperbole to call changes in the NASDAQ stock market 
“extraordinary,” since that market became highly automated earlier on.76 
But “extraordinary” has been a word used to describe “changes in the 
nature of trading for NYSE-listed stock.”77 This is probably best explained 
using a numbers timeline. In a 2000 concept release, the SEC stated that: 
The markets for listed equities currently reflect a fairly low degree of 
fragmentation. In September 1999, for example, 74.4% of the trades and 83.9% 
of the share volume in NYSE-listed equities were executed on the NYSE. 
Similarly, approximately 68.7% of the trades and 70.5% of the share volume in 
Amex-listed securities were executed on the Amex. Thus, a large proportion of 
                                                                                                                           
 
public exchanges, a growing volume of trades are taking place in private exchanges and dark pools, 
away from the purview of the public. ‘A dark pool is an anonymous crossing network that allows 
institutions to hide their orders from the marketplace.’”). 
71 O’Hara & Ye, supra note 68, at 1. 
72 See, e.g., Rene Pastor & Marcy Nicholson, WRAPUP 3-NYBOT Launches Electronic Trade, 
Eyes on NYMEX, REUTERS, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/02/markets-nybot-
electronic-idUSN0238916720070202. 
73 Supra note 6. 
74 Id. 
75 Zachery Kouwe, It’s Now Curtains for Commodities at NYBOT, N.Y. POST, Dec. 14, 2007, 
http:// www.nypost.com/p/news/business/item_4ui3IdznzHBGcRJVUP0ApL;jsessionid= 
F9993F0521C39E092D59604DF6400BAB; Gregory Meyer, ICE to Close New York Trading Floor, 
FIN. TIMES, July 26, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/308212ce-d74d-11e1-a378-00144feabdc0.html# 
axzz2RDeWSh62. 
76 See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 50, at 3594; see also Commission 
Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Release No. 30-42450, File No. SR-
NYSE-99-48, Feb. 23, 2000. 
77 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 50, at 3595 (“The changes in the 
nature of trading for NYSE-listed stocks have been extraordinary, as indicated by the comparisons of 
trading in 2005 and 2009. . . .”). See also Lin, supra note 12, at 691 (“In 2010, more than 60 percent of 
trading in stocks listed on the NYSE occurred on separate computerized exchanges.”). 
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the order flow in listed equity securities currently is routed to a single market 
center with . . . only one market maker—the specialist.78 
Fast forward by a decade, and another concept release by the Commission 
stated that “NYSE executed approximately 79.1% of the consolidated share 
volume in its listed stocks in January 2005, compared to 25.1% in October 
2009 . . . . NYSE’s average speed of execution for small, immediately 
executable (marketable) orders was 10.1 seconds in January 2005, 
compared to 0.7 seconds in October 2009.79 Additionally, research done in 
2009 revealed that “more than 50% of volume [was] trading away from the 
listing exchange.”80 
Fragmentation has its benefits and its vices. In terms of benefits, the 
SEC, in a 2010 concept release, highlighted that fragmentation promotes 
beneficial competition among markets.81 “The benefits of such competition 
include incentives for trading centers to create new products, provide high 
quality trading services that meet the needs of investors, and keep trading 
fees low.”82 Furthermore price competition may be enhanced where there 
are multiple dealers in different market centers competing for order flow on 
the basis of displayed quotations.83 In addition, the existence of multiple 
trading centers has provided more trading options, which has created 
“greater latency and more sophisticated crossing networks.”84 
But without proper balance in market structure, fragmentation may be 
problematic: Fragmentation may have a potentially adverse effect on 
“efficiency, price transparency, best execution of investor orders, and order 
interaction.”85 In terms of pricing, the existence of multiple market centers 
“may reduce competition on price, which is one of the most important 
benefits of greater interaction of buying and selling interest in an individual 
                                                                                                                           
 
78 Commission Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, supra note 76, 
at 10579 (emphasis added). 
79 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 50, at 3595–96. The emphasis in this 
quote was added by the author. 
80 O’Hara & Ye, supra note 68, at 1. 
81 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 50, at 3597. 
82 Id. (“On the other hand, mandating the consolidation of order flow in a single venue would 
create a monopoly and thereby lose the important benefits of competition among markets.”). 
83 Commission Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, supra note 76, 
at 10580. 
84 O’Hara & Ye, supra note 68, at 1. 
85 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 50, at 3597. 
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security.”86 There also is concern that fragmentation harms market quality 
by “reducing the liquidity available not only in individual markets but in the 
aggregate market as well.”87 Also, the plethora of disconnected trading 
venues may not only be fragmenting the market but rather “fracturing [it] 
into many disparate pieces.”88 
How regulators achieve this balance or and to what extent, if any, 
fragmentation should be curbed, is beyond the scope of this paper. What is 
of interest is how the ICE-NYX merger factors into this discussion. At least 
with regards to the U.S., ICE’s CEO, Sprecher, has indicated that 
fragmentation has gone too far: “The pendulum of electronification of 
markets went too far in the case of U.S. equities—to the point that people 
want to know there’s a human being watching over their trades. . . .”89 
Sprecher also highlights that while “[c]ompetition is good[,] fragmentation 
creates risks which aren’t priced in.’ The U.S. probably doesn’t need 70 
execution venues and 200 internalizers.”90 The plan is therefore to maintain 
the trading floors of the NYSE after (and if) the merger is completed.91 And 
by merging two market giants the ICE-NYX transactions seem to be a 
move toward consolidation.92 ICE, however, as was discussed in Part II of 
this paper, has a history of reforming or substantially altering business 
structure after its acquisitions. Hence, ultimately, only time will tell the true 
price of this merger on an already fragmented financial service market. 
                                                                                                                           
 
86 Commission Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, supra note 76, 
at 10580. 
87 O’Hara & Ye, supra note 68, at 1. 
88 Id. at 2. 
89 Popper, supra note 6 (Sprecher made this statement while explaining that ICE did not plan to 
uproot the floors of the NYSE when (and if) the merger is completed because “[t]he American stock 
market, and the nation, need it.”). 
90 (ICE) Merger With NYX, supra note 31. 
91 Popper, supra note 6. Cf. Lin, supra note 12, at 690 (“Later in December 2012, the 
IntercontinentalExchange, an electronic derivatives and commodities exchange, announced a takeover 
of the NYSE. In light of these developments, it is probably safe to predict that a day will come in the 
near future when human traders no longer roam the NYSE’s famed trading floor.”). 
92 (ICE) Merger With NYX, supra note 31 (quoting Sprecher as saying: “[C]ontinental Europe 
needs more consolidation in the exchange space. . . . I want Euronext to be the first mover in continued 
consolidation or federation. We are trying to stimulate that conversation in Europe.”). 
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B. The Merger as Impetus or Retardant for SEC-CFTC Consolidation 
A lot of contested legal issues are discussed for a short while but then 
fade away into the world of scholarly forgetfulness. That, however, is not 
the case when it comes to the issue of whether the SEC and CFTC should 
be consolidated into one entity.93 One scholar suggests that this discussion 
regarding the consolidation of the SEC and CFTC into one regulatory body 
started as early as 1988.94 The discourse continues because the dynamism 
of the markets and the innovation surrounding financial products are 
unrelentingly pushing at jurisdictional boundaries: to the point that 
demarcations as to what lies within the SEC’s jurisdiction and what falls on 
CFTC’s turf are beginning to appear artificial. One area in which this is 
very evident is in the swaps market: because of their “unique” nature swaps 
require regulation both by the SEC and CFTC.95 
                                                                                                                           
 
93 See John D. Benson, Ending the Turf Wars: Support for a CFTC/SEC Consolidation, 36 VILL. 
L. REV. 1175 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of 
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. LAW. 447, 449–50 (1995); 
Mark Frederick Hoffman, Decreasing the Costs of Jurisdictional Gridlock: Merger of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
681 (1995); David B. Esau, Joint Regulation of Single Stock Futures: Cause or Result of Regulatory 
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TAX L.J. 410, 442–45 (2004); Richard Carlucci, Harmonizing U.S. Securities and Futures Regulations, 
2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 461, 461 (2008); Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—
A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 586–611 (2009). See also Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert 
B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, (2010); Elizabeth F. Brown, 
E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 
14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, (2005). 
94 Coffee, supra note 93, at 449–51 (“Since the Brady Report recommended that both the SEC 
and the CFTC be placed under the general oversight of the Federal Reserve Board, proposals to 
reallocate or consolidate authority between the SEC and the CFTC have been common.”). “The Brady 
Report recommended a single regulatory agency that would have oversight responsibility over the SEC, 
the CFTC, and other agencies. It proposed that this oversight role be given to the Federal Reserve 
Board.” Id. at n.12. 
95 See M. Holland West & Matthew K. Kerfoot, The Impact of Dodd-Frank on Derivatives, 18 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 269, 273 (2013) (“Dodd-Frank allocates jurisdiction over the OTC 
derivatives markets between the SEC for ‘security-based swaps’ and certain participants in the security-
based swaps markets, and the CFTC for all other ‘swaps’ and certain participants in the swaps 
markets.”). See also Kevin Drawbaugh, Factbox: Some Financial Reforms Missing from U.S. 
Legislation, REUTERS, June 10, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/10/us-financial-
regulation-missing-idUSTRE6594UB20100610; Markham, supra note 93, at 552 (“One part of that 
effort is its recommendation to combine the SEC and CFTC. This recommendation seems, at least on 
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In addition, market failures and crises—as the one spawning 
2007/2008 in the United States—raise the question as to the efficiency of 
having a fragmented regulatory framework.96 Furthermore, those who argue 
for consolidation also highlight that the U.S. regulatory structure 
disadvantageously comprises of “a thicket of complicated rules,” and lots of 
“overlapping and unnecessary regulation.”97 This complex structure 
coupled with a litigious society, it is argued, has made the United States 
unattractive to investors.98 This line of reasoning, however, is a matter that 
goes beyond the issue of extensive, overlapping rules of the SEC and 
CFTC: rather, it is a product of the U.S. regulatory framework, in general.99 
                                                                                                                           
 
the surface, to be an improvement because both agencies largely regulate financial products, and the two 
markets are rapidly converging.”). 
96 Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CAL. L. REV. 
327, 332 (2013) (“This Article argues that the agency independence paradigm is under attack. The 
financial crisis of 2007–08 prompted policy makers worldwide to establish new regulatory mechanisms 
designed to monitor financial institutions more thoroughly and to facilitate intervention in case of 
emergency.”). 
97 Markham, supra note 93, at 538–39. 
98 See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude Is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is The United 
States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 369, 376 (2008); Markham, supra note 93, at 540 (“In 2006, only one such offering was listed 
on a U.S. exchange, and foreign firms delisting from U.S. exchanges set a record that year. Statistics 
also evidenced that foreign firms were turning to unregulated private offerings when they sought to raise 
funds in the United States. IPOs by U.S. companies abroad also significantly increased.”); Karmel, 
supra note 47, at 356–57 (“However, the primary reasons why the NYSE has been losing listings is that 
foreign issuers are disenchanted with the U.S. stock market because of the costs of compliance with the 
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) and because of the U.S. culture of 
shareholder litigation.”). 
99 This is not to say that the SEC’s or CFTC’s regulatory scheme is without fault. Criticism of 
rules imposed on companies under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”)—measured against the benefits 
reaped—has been voiced to a point of exhaustion. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 47, at 356–57 (citing the 
costs of compliance with requirements of SOX as one factor dissuading investors); Cress, supra note 45, 
at 398 (2012) (“Some argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 hindered the United States’ 
competitive position in the global exchange market.”). 
Also note that the cry for this kind of reform of the U.S. regulatory system is not uniform. See, 
e.g., Renee M. Jones, Back to Basics: Why Financial Regulatory Overhaul Is Overrated, 4 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 389, 389 (2010) (“In this essay, I suggest that regulatory overhaul is the 
wrong prescription for our times. We should instead pursue a ‘Back to Basics’ approach to regulatory 
reform. A Back to Basics strategy is founded on the notion that the regulatory system erected as part of 
the New Deal, while imperfect, worked for more than seventy years to forestall the kind of catastrophic 
collapse we are currently experiencing. On this analysis, the current crisis cannot be properly attributed 
to a failure to modernize financial regulation. It is instead more appropriate to view the current collapse 
as the end result of a systematic effort to dismantle the regulatory structure created during the New 
Deal.”). 
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In the United States, there are over 115 state and federal agencies 
regulating the financing services industry.100 This so-called functional 
approach has been criticized not only for being the most expensive in the 
world, but also for an inability to adapt to market changes, and for 
inconsistent regulations among competitors.101 Furthermore, one report 
stated concerns that not one these agencies would be fully equipped to 
handle the exigencies of a crisis by itself.102 Also, the multiple-agency 
structure actually hinders the government from catching and monitoring 
crises at their early stages.103 
Despite these concerns, and the recent financial crisis, the United 
States has not changed its regulatory model. Nonetheless, taking small 
steps, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) was created by 
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.104 FSOC’s primary objectives are: to identify 
risks to the United States’ financial system, that could arise within and 
outside of the financial services marketplace; promote market discipline by 
eliminating the idea that companies are too big to fail; and “respond to 
emerging threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system.”105 The 
effectiveness of FSOC is yet to be tested (and ideally it will not need to be). 
Hence, even after the recent post-crisis reform, the SEC and CFTC 
remain independent agencies. Furthermore, any merger between the two is 
unlikely: even if there is to be a consolidation, it will not be anytime soon. 
The lack of a SEC-CFTC merger is not because such a restructuring would 
not be logical—considering the growing overlap of the products and 
                                                                                                                           
 
100 Brown, supra note 93, at 11. See also Kokkoris & Olivares-Caminal, supra note 47, at 440–71 
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regulators: (1) federal laws passed by the U.S. Congress, (2) state laws passed by State legislatures, 
(3) regulations enacted by agencies (e.g., the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), and 
(4) regulation enacted by self-regulatory organizations (“SROs,” e.g., Nasdaq, the NYSE, the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange, and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.”). 
101 Brown, supra note 93, at 3. 
102 Id. at 6 (citing U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, FINANCIAL REGULATION—
INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE 110 (Oct. 2004)). 
103 Id. at 6. 
104 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 
2012 Annual Report, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, 11 (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/ 
Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf [hereinafter FSOC Report 2012]. 
105 FSOC Report 2012, supra note 104, at 11. 
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industries they regulate, it probably is. Rather, this result is more a product 
of politics: For many, “in a perfect world the two agencies would be 
combined, but that just isn’t Washington.”106 Sure enough, as the financial 
world continues to converge, the case for unified regulation becomes 
stronger. In addition, the trend of consolidation among exchanges—
including stock and derivative markets—will continue to make justification 
of the independent agency approach a lot more difficult.107 
Other theories put forward to explain why the two agencies will not 
give up their jurisdiction includes: (1) the daunting challenge of “combining 
the often-conflicting cultures of the agencies,” and (2) the fight over 
allocation of jurisdiction that would ensue between competing 
congressional committees.108 After the recent crisis, this age-old suggestion 
of consolidating the two agencies was one of the suggested reform 
proposals for buttressing the U.S. financial system.109 It should come as no 
shock to know that the proposal did not come to fruition.110 
This article also argues that the ICE-NYX merger does not necessitate 
a consolidation of the two entities. By forming ICE Group—a holding 
                                                                                                                           
 
106 Drawbaugh, supra note 95; see also supra note 93. 
107 The challenge in finding the right balance between a multi-regulator system and market 
growth and change becomes even more daunting in the context of cross-border mergers. See, e.g., 
Phillip M. Johnson, Exchange Consolidations: Help or Hospice, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 977, 984 (2012) 
(“Where more than one regulator has the burden of market integrity and performance, neither will want 
to reduce its grip over policy, supervision, or enforcement. For cross-border link-ups, this impediment is 
magnified. In a European/U.S. merger like Deutsche Boerse and NYSE Euronext, each of the national 
regulators wanted to retain the tools necessary to protect the people they are sworn to serve. Even if one 
regulator is assigned “primary” responsibility, others retain a seat at the table for key decisions and 
during crises. This could not only produce a shifting regulatory landscape for the combined exchanges 
but require that key functions—clearing, surveillance, rule enforcement—remain separate in order to 
accommodate local authorities and thus reduce the normal cost benefits of consolidations.”). 
108 Markham, supra note 93, at 552. 
109 Gadinis, supra note 96, at 365–66 (“Other countries consolidated some of their existing 
regulators but allowed them to maintain separate existences from the countries’ central banks . . . . 
However, the United States abandoned a more ambitious plan that involved the merger of the SEC with 
the CFTC.”); Drawbaugh, supra note 95 (“The Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulate such closely linked markets that critics have long 
argued the two agencies should be one. When the Obama administration took over in 2009 and the 
financial crisis was at its peak, a CFTC-SEC merger looked possible. But as Congress began hammering 
out a politically realistic set of reforms, the merger slipped from view. Neither agency wanted it since it 
would threaten jobs and turf. Financial services industry lobbyists were divided.”). See also Markham, 
supra note 93, at 538 (discussing the proposal to merge the SEC and the CFTC). 
110 Gadinis, supra note 96, at 365–66. 
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company—under which both ICE and NYX will operate as wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, the regulatory status quo can be maintained.111 This kind of 
arrangement was successful—as to avert much change in terms of 
regulatory oversight—in the NYSE-Euronext merger, and should be the 
same in this instance. 
C. Antitrust and Nationalist Issues 
One of the biggest hurdles companies face in efforts to successfully 
complete a merger is antitrust law. This is even more burdensome in cases 
of cross border exchanges where the approval of different jurisdictions is 
required.112 In instances of mega-mergers or mergers between prominent 
derivatives and stock exchanges, regulators are very wary of the large 
potential for monopoly.113 Antitrust and competition laws seek to protect 
free markets and, for the benefit of customers, protect competition.114 
Exchange mergers invoke this body of law because of the severe impact 
these mergers may have on competition among stock exchanges.115 These 
mergers may not only lead to higher fees or lower quality service, but also 
“to a post-merger market characterized by a lower degree of competition, 
and thus a lower degree of innovation and improvement in exchange 
services.”116 Hence, “[e]ven the potential for eliminating the possibility of 
dual listings of the same securities or derivatives could give antitrust 
authorities reason for pause.”117 
In instances of cross-border mergers, ultimate approval or disapproval 
by regulators oftentimes is contingent not only on competition rules but 
also nationalist tendencies. In terms of nationalist tendencies, exchanges are 
                                                                                                                           
 
111 ICE’s Form 425, supra note 39. 
112 Johnson, supra note 107, at 983–84 (“This concern is elevated for cross-border alliances, not 
only because multiple competition reviews will occur but because a sense of “dominance” at the 
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113 See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti & Thomas Catan, Feds Sink Nasdaq’s Bid to Buy Big Board, WALL 
ST. J., May 17, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870342120457632687012149 
8918.html (stating that Nasdaq’s and ICE’s bid for NYSE would be a “merger to monopoly.”). 
114 See Bruce J. Prager, Antitrust Issues in Mergers and Acquisition, SU016 ALI-ABA 137, at 
139 (2012). 
115 Kokkoris & Olivares-Caminal, supra note 47, at 455. 
116 Id. 
117 Johnson, supra note 107, at 983–84. 
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often seen as “historic landmarks of national pride.”118 There is also a 
fear—for economic and nationalist reasons—of becoming subject to the 
regulation of a foreign country.119 Foreigners are particular wary about 
becoming subject to U.S. regulatory scheme, which many find expensive 
and extensive.120 
Nationalist pride played a significant role in precluding mergers 
between the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”) and Canada’s TMX Group 
(“TMX”), and Singapore Exchange Ltd. and Australia’s ASX Ltd.121 With 
regards to the LSE-TMX merger, the Maple Group—”[a] consortium of 
thirteen Canadian banks, pension plans and financial firms”—sought a 
“made-in-Canada” alternative by launching a rival bid.122 Similarly, there 
was a strong opposition to the NYX merger especially among political 
figures, who called for a “European solution”: the perception was that “the 
American NYSE would dominate the French exchange.”123 Of course, the 
merger was successful in the end. 
Moving back to the umbrella issue of antitrust, within the last few 
years there has been a number of instances where competition laws blocked 
exchange mergers. Joint efforts by Nasdaq and ICE to acquire NYSE were 
thwarted when the DOJ indicated that it would challenge the transaction.124 
There was concern that, if successful, this transaction would have 
potentially created a monopoly and “would have substantially eliminated 
competition for corporate stock listing services, opening and closing stock 
                                                                                                                           
 
118 Bo Harvey, Exchange Consolidation and Models of International Securities Regulation, 18 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 151, 151 (2007). See also Lucchetti & Catan, supra note 113 (“The Big 
Board’s roots as an icon of American capitalism go back to 1792, when traders signed an agreement 
under a buttonwood tree on Wall Street.”) (emphasis added); Isidore, supra note 13 (“The NYSE lists 
shares of most of the nation’s leading companies, and its trading floor is the very symbol of Wall 
Street.”). 
119 See Cress, supra note 45, at 385–89. 
120 Id. 
121 Pav Jordan & Luke Jeffs, LSE, TMX abort their merger, leaving both in play, REUTERS 
(June 29, 2011, 5:26 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/29/us-tmx-halt-
idUSTRE75S5KL20110629 (“The failure, which follows Singapore Exchange Ltd.’s scuttled bid for 
Australia’s ASX Ltd, is the latest sign of nationalist pride frustrating cross-border deals for highly 
symbolic capital markets.”); Johnson, supra note 107, at 984. 
122 Jordan & Jeffs, supra note 121; TSX, LSE takeover falls apart, CBC NEWS (June 29, 2011, 
1:07 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2011/06/29/tsx-lse-takeover.html. 
123 Kim, supra note 45, at 86. 
124 Lucchetti & Catan, supra note 113. 
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auction services, off-exchange stock reporting services and real-time 
proprietary equity data products.”125 On the other hand, although there were 
concerns that a CME-CBOT merger would have been anticompetitive, 
since it would concentrate 85% of the “United States’ market for exchange-
traded futures in a single exchange,” the merger was ultimately 
successful.126 
In terms of cross-border linkages, one that fell victim to antitrust issues 
in recent years was the NYX-Deutsche Börse Group (NYX-DB) merger.127 
The concern was that, aggregating futures and options, NYX-DB would 
have controlled a substantial portion of the European derivatives market—
approximately 91%.128 Although U.S. antitrust authorities approved the 
deal, the European Commission believed “the deal would create a ‘quasi-
monopoly’ in exchanges’ trading of European derivatives.”129 
At this stage, the ICE-NYX deal has successfully passed U.S. antitrust 
requirements.130 It has also been approved by European regulators who 
“confirmed that the proposed transaction would not raise competition 
concerns as NYX and ICE are not direct competitors in the markets 
concerned and would continue to face competition from a number of other 
competitors.”131 The Commission did not identify any competition concerns 
“as regards the vertical relationship between trading and clearing of 
derivatives” and, furthermore, “NYX and ICE are offering contracts 
belonging to different product markets so their activities do not overlap.”132 
                                                                                                                           
 
125 Prager, supra note 114, at 1; Lucchetti & Catan, supra note 113 (DOJ stating the transaction 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The ICE-NYX merger embodies what the financial services industry is 
becoming and captures the model that will allow exchanges to remain 
competitive in today’s marketplace: mega-exchanges with broader asset 
classes and electronic platforms. As technology and globalization threaten 
their vitality, exchanges will need to continue reinventing and adapting.133 
Increasingly over the last decade they have done so by merging and by 
moving, at least a part of, their operations on screen. ICE is a good model 
for other exchanges to follow. It has been able to establish itself as a market 
leader in a very short period of time—thirteen years, compared to 
exchanges that have been around for hundreds of years. It has done so by 
exploiting electronic trading. If successful, the ICE-NYX merger will raise 
the bar once more for the industry. 
                                                                                                                           
 
133 Lucchetti & Catan, supra note 113 (“[Nasdaq’s] impending takeover of the NYSE follows a 
consolidation wave among exchanges around the world as they seek new sources of growth and try to 
avoid being left behind other exchanges that are joining forces.”); see also Cress, supra note 45, at 388–
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